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Abstract 
To examine the importance of corporate governance, I look at how management 
and investors behave in the event of seasoned bond offerings, controlling for the 
corporate governance structure of issuing firms. I find that companies with the 
weakest governance structure aggressively manipulate their earnings upwards 
during the two years prior to the debt issuances. And when the bond offerings are 
announced to the market, these same firms experienced positive abnormal returns 
over a three day event period, indicating that investors of poorly governed firms 
value a debt financing for the alleged decrease in agency cost. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Along with the recent financial crisis, discussion over corporate 
governance has once again come onto the center stage. Its importance has long 
been recognized since the collapse of Enron and WorldCom and previous 
literatures have documented evidence suggesting a positive relationship between a 
firm's value and its corporate governance structure1. However, little has been done 
to study the direct impact corporate governance has on managers' behavior and 
investors' decision making process. Will managers conduct business more properly 
in companies with good governance than those in poorly governed firms? Will 
investors take a company's corporate governance into consideration when making 
stock buy and sell decisions?  Using seasoned bond offerings as a triggering event, 
I look at these questions in this paper and provide new evidence for the importance 
of corporate governance. 
The first part of the study looks at the earnings management effort of bond 
issuing firms before and after the offering year, conditioned on the corporate 
governance structure of issuing firms. Entrenchment index developed in Bebchuk, 
                                                            
1 See for example Gompers et al (2003). 
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Cohen and Ferrell (2009) and governance index by Gompers et al are employed as 
proxy for corporate governance quality. Following Teol et al (1998), I estimate the 
earnings management efforts of issuing firms by calculating their discretional 
current accruals using a modified Jones model. While there is no detectable 
manipulation in earnings for the full sample, a clear pattern emerges after further 
grouping the full sample. Firms with the weakest governance structure display 
significantly positive earnings management in the two years prior to the bond 
issuing, whereas firms that are soundly governed show no such attempts. This 
result is quite intuitive as managers in a poorly governed firm are more likely to be 
over-entrenched, subject to fewer restraints and generally have more freedom to 
conduct the business in whichever way they like, properly or not. This study 
contributes by providing empirical evidence supporting this argument. 
The other main interest of this study is to find out how investors react to 
the bond issuing announcement and whether their reactions differ among firms 
with different corporate governance structure. The study of market reaction to the 
issuance of various securities is no new topic. Literature in this area is rather 
abundant. However, the existing results of the stock valuation effect of seasoned 
bond offering are quite confounding. The earliest literature has documented a 
positive stock price change while later studies argue that the market reactions are 
only non-positive. 2  No factors have been singled out as having a significant 
influence on the stock valuation effect of corporate bond offering. I look at the 
same question by introducing corporate governance as one of the explanatory 
variables. The results show that the market reaction to the announcement of 
seasoned bond offering is not significantly different from zero for the full sample, 
                                                            
2 See for example Masulis (1983) and Eckbo (1986). 
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which is consistent with existing literatures. But after divided into different groups 
according to the issuing firms' corporate governance, I document a positive 
cumulative abnormal return for firms that are poorly governed. One possible 
explanation for the result is what Jensen and Meckling argued in their 1976 paper. 
They posit that the cost of agency problems decreases as firms' leverage increases. 
The creation of debt will provide more incentives for the managers to perform as 
failures to make debt repayment will lead to bankruptcy in which the manager will 
lose its job. These agency problem related benefits are only significant to firms 
that are poorly governed, as for these firms negligence and mismanagement of 
entrenched executives are more likely to be investors' major concern. This result 
not only serves as a new evidence verifying the importance of corporate 
governance since it actually goes into the decision making process when an 
investor makes stock buy-and-sell judgments, it also provides a new insight when 
examining stock valuation effect of bond offering. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Chapter 2 reviews previous 
literatures on corporate governance, earnings management and seasoned bond 
offering. Chapter 3 presents the 4 hypotheses. Data and sample selection are 
described in chapter 4. Chapter 5 explains the methodology employed in this paper. 
Chapter 6 provides results and analysis. Chapter 7 concludes. 
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
2.1 Corporate governance 
Corporate governance is a manifestation of the agency problem resulted 
from the separation of ownership and control in modern corporations. A company 
raises capital from numerous investors to operate and expand a business, and 
investors need the managers' specialized talents and experience to generate returns 
for the capital they invest in the firm. However, because the persons who actually 
use the funds (the managers, i.e., the agents) are not the owners of the money (the 
investors, i.e., the principal), managers would have incentives to misuse the money 
to benefit themselves, such as to undertake over-risky investments, to show a lack 
of due diligence, to distribute an excessive amount of bonus to themselves or to 
conduct outright expropriation. Although previous literatures have dealt with how 
the agency problems can be solved under certain assumptions (see, e.g., E.F. Fama 
(1980), and Jensen and Fama (1983)), it's still an established fact that in reality, 
the agency problems are widely present and have a significant impact on the 
development of modern corporations. 
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In Shleifer et al. (2000), corporate governance is defined as "a set of 
mechanisms through which outside investors protect themselves against 
expropriation by the insiders". Such mechanisms include the introduction of board 
of directors and independent directors, the establishment of various committees 
within the board such as audit committee, remuneration committee etc, and 
shareholders' rights to vote with regard to significant company decisions. There is 
a wide range of literatures documenting positive relationships between a 
company's good corporate governance and its shareholders' value. Core, 
Holthausen, Larcker (1999) found that firms with weaker governance structures 
have greater agency problems, that CEOs with greater agency problems receive 
bigger compensation and that firms with greater agency problems perform worse. 
In Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003), it's observed that the corporate governance 
quality of a company has a significant impact on the firm's value. Bebchuk, Cohen 
and Ferrell (2009) built up an entrenchment index as a measure of a firm's 
corporate governance quality and found that increases in the index level, which is 
a decrease in firm's corporate governance quality, are monotonically associated 
with economically significant reductions in firm valuation as well as large 
negative abnormal returns during the 1990-2003 period. 
Because corporate governance is a mechanism utilized to deal with the 
agency problem resulted from external financing, a company with good corporate 
governance is believed to have lower financing cost. Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003) 
found that firms facing stronger external monitoring through effective mechanisms 
are rewarded with lower yields and superior bond ratings. On the other hand, firms 
with poor corporate governance may have a hard time raising external funds at all. 
According to Barca (1995) and Pagano, Panetta, and Zingales (1995), Italian 
 6 
 
corporate governance mechanisms are so underdeveloped as to substantially 
undermine a firm’s ability to raise external capital.  
Previous literatures mostly focused on the relationship between corporate 
governance and a firm's value and used it as a reflection of the importance of 
corporate governance. Little has been done to study the direct impact corporate 
governance has on managers' behavior and investors' decision making process. 
Will managers conduct business more properly in companies with good 
governance than those in poorly governed firms? Will investors take a company's 
corporate governance into consideration when making stock buy and sell decisions? 
Sonda et al. (2001) studied the relationship between a firm's corporate governance 
and the magnitude of its earnings management effort and found that managers in 
better governed firms are more restrained from manipulating the income numbers 
and misleading outside investors. Chen, Elder and Hsieh found a similar result in 
Taiwan stock market. Acknowledging earnings management effort as a good 
measure of how properly managers conduct daily business in companies with 
different corporate governance structure, I, too, look at the relationship between 
earnings management and corporate governance of a company. Different from 
their studies, I study this relationship in the context of seasoned bond offering, 
taking it as a triggering event for the earnings management activity. Meanwhile, 
by looking at how shareholders react differently to the bond offering 
announcement conditioned on the corporate governance practice of issuing firms, I 
examine whether investors take a firm's corporate governance into account when 
making share purchase and sale decisions.  
To carry out the study, a proxy for the corporate governance quality of a 
firm is needed. In Core, Holthausen, Larcker (1999), the quality of corporate 
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governance is assessed by the board structure and ownership structure of a firm. 
The structure of board of directors is evaluated in several dimensions including the 
percentage of the board composed of inside directors, board size, the percentage of 
the board who are outside directors appointed by the CEO, the percentage of the 
board who are grey outside directors, the percentage of outside directors who are 
over age 69, the percentage of outside directors who serve on three or more other 
boards (six or more other boards if retired), and whether the CEO is also a chair. 
The ownership structure is simply the CEO’s stake in the company. Their 
corporate governance measurement is able to capture the specific features of 
governance structure of different firms. However it’s not very easy to make 
overall comparisons among firms using this approach. 
Gompers, Isshii and Metrick (2003) developed a Governance Index (G-
index) covering about 1,500 companies in the U.S market since 1990. The G-
index  is built on 24 corporate governance provisions, most of which are directly 
related to management’s options to resist a hostile takeover such as "poison pills", 
"golden parachutes", "antigreemail" etc. 3 The G-index is constructed in the 
following way: for every firm, one point is added for every provision that reduces 
shareholder rights. Therefore, the higher the index, the fewer rights are granted to 
shareholders, which can be considered as a reflection of poor corporate 
governance. In Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell (2009), this G-index is further studied 
and six provisions4 are singled out from the original 24 provisions included in G-
index as having the strongest correlation with reduction in firm valuation and 
negative abnormal return between 1990 and 2003. The other 18 provisions are 
                                                            
3 A detailed list and description of the 24 provisions from Gompers et al (2003) is included in Appendix 1 
4 The six provisions include staggered boards, limits to shareholder bylaw amendments, poison pills, golden 
parachutes, supermajority requirements for mergers, and charter amendments. 
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found to have little impact. A new governance index, named as entrenchment 
index or E-index, is constructed based on the six provisions. Each company in 
their database is given a score, from zero to six, that equals to the number of 
provisions adopted by the company in a given month or year. In this article, E-
index is used as a primary proxy for a firm's corporate governance quality whereas 
similar tests are also carried out using G-index as robustness check. 
2.2 Earnings management 
Before reviewing literatures discussing earnings management, it's better to 
have a clear understanding about what is earnings management. In Healy and 
Wahlen (1998), a definition is given as follows: "earnings management occurs 
when managers use judgment in financial reporting and in structuring transactions 
to alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying 
economic performance of the company, or to influence contractual outcomes that 
depend on reported accounting numbers". It's quoted here because the author 
thinks it managed to cover the two most important factors in defining earnings 
management. Firstly, it is a result of manager's discretion. Listed companies in the 
U.S follow Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) when preparing 
financial statements. As all principles, GAAP is not a set of hard solid rules that 
leave no room for adjustment. In fact, a general need for discretion is widely 
recognized. Managers can achieve a better disclosure of the firm performance if 
they apply their discretion properly. As stated in the Statement of Financial 
Accounting Concepts No.1, paragraph 44: “Information about enterprise earnings 
and its components measured by accrual accounting generally provides a better 
indication of enterprise performance than does information about current cash 
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receipts and payments.” However, it can also be exploited as a way to manipulate 
earnings for unjustified purposes. This is the second defining factor for earnings 
management - the motivation has to be a distortion of the real income and attempts 
for unjustified benefits either for the company or for the management itself. 
Earnings management literatures can be roughly divided into to two groups. 
The first group studies the incentives for earnings management, i.e., what 
motivates managers to manipulate earnings. The other group studies the methods 
to calculate earnings management, aimed at designing an accurate proxy for a 
firm's earnings management effort.  
2.2.1 Motivations for earnings management 
One motivation documented as a major reason for earnings management 
arises from the capital market. Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998b) recorded 
aggressive positive earnings management for firms making seasoned public 
offerings as an attempt to achieve better pricing in the stock market. And they also 
relate this earnings management effort to the poor stock performance in the 
subsequent three years. Shivakumar (2000) found a similar result for firms making 
seasoned public offerings. He showed that firms overstate earnings around equity 
offerings and pre-offering abnormal accruals predict subsequent declines in net 
income. In addition, he also looked at whether investors recognize and undo the 
effects of such earnings management at the offering announcements. The result 
shows that investors seem to correct the price impact of earlier earnings 
management, as evidenced by a negative relation between pre-announcement 
abnormal accruals and the stock price reaction to the offering announcements.  
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For initial public offerings, the results are quite mixed. Teoh Welch and 
Wong (1998a) recorded aggressive earnings management for firms that are 
undertaking IPOs, whereas Ball and Shivakumar (2008) argue that the magnitude 
of earnings management effort of initial public offering (IPO) firms is far less 
significant than documented by previous literatures. They argue that when a firm 
goes public, it’s demanded by public investors of higher quality financial reporting 
since public investors experience higher information asymmetry than private 
investors. And a set of mechanisms is in place to enforce the actual delivery of 
such high quality financial reporting, such as reputation effects, cost of capital 
effects, and monitoring by internal and external auditors, boards, analysts, rating 
agencies, the press, litigators and the other parties. The reported discrepancy 
between their results and those of Teoh Welch and Wong (1998a) and other 
similar studies is indicated as a result of a biased approach employed.  
Earnings management is not only in one direction. There are various 
circumstances in which managers might actually want to decrease their earnings. 
For example, Gong, Louis, and Sun (2008) found that firms aggressively manage 
their earnings downwards before making an open market repurchase so that the 
cost of the repurchase can be lowered. One interesting finding of their study is that 
the negative pre-repurchase abnormal accruals increase with the percentage of the 
stock that the managers repurchase and CEO ownership, which reflects the notion 
that managers have greater incentives to deflate earnings when the potential 
benefits from downward earnings management are greater. Furthermore, they 
document a significant negative correlation between the pre-repurchase abnormal 
accruals and the both the future operating performance and future stock 
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performance and conclude that the post-repurchase performance improvement is at 
least partly driven by the pre-repurchase earnings management. 
Another type of motivation for earnings management is contracting 
motivations. For instance, the compensation of an executive may be closely 
related to a firm's earnings increase; various provisions in bond covenants may be 
tied up to a firm's financial performance. In Watts and Zimmerman (1978), it's 
suggested that managers have incentive to manipulate earnings as it's too costly for 
remuneration committees or creditors to detect such activities. Caton, 
Chiyachantana, Chua and Goh (2008) found significant earnings management 
efforts by issuers in the year of the seasoned bond offering although in their study, 
there is no evidence showing that rating agencies are actually misled by this 
window dressing effort. Healy (1985) states that bonus schemes create incentives 
for managers to select accounting procedures and accruals to maximize the value 
of their bonus awards. They found that managers are more likely to choose income 
decreasing accruals when the upper or lower bounds of their bonus plan are 
binding. Guidry, Leone and Rock (1999) further supported this finding by looking 
at whether the divisional head in U.S. conglomerate manage earnings so as to 
maximize their bonus and found strong evidence suggesting so. Holthausen, 
Larcker and Sloan (1995) extended Healy (1985) by showing no significant 
downward earnings management when the lower bound of managers’ bonus plan 
is binding. 
The third type of earnings management motivation comes from regulatory 
concerns. Guenther (1994) investigated whether accounting earnings of U.S. firms 
are managed in response to the upcoming changes in statutory corporate income 
tax rate brought about by the Tax Reform Act of 1986. The results of empirical 
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test reported significantly negative current accruals for large firms for year prior to 
the tax reform. Similarly, Jones (1991) found that managers decrease earnings 
through earnings accruals manipulation during import relief investigations (e.g. 
tariff increases and quota reductions). Managers in this special context are argued 
to have more incentive and freedom to manipulate earnings because in this case, 
the losing end of the wealth transfer caused by the dishonest disclosure is a group 
of consumers whose stakes are highly diffused. 
2.2.2 Measurements of earnings management 
One of the major debates in earnings management researches is over its 
measurement. Broadly divided, there are two types of measurement approaches 
that have received wide attention. The first is based on decomposing total accruals 
into one discretionary component and a non discretionary one, and then use non 
discretionary accruals as a proxy for a firm's earnings management activity. 
DeAngelo (1986), Healy (1985), and McNichols and Wilson (1988) laid out a 
foundation for using discretional accruals as a proxy for earnings management. 
Jones (1991) modified their models and relaxed the assumptions that non 
discretionary accruals are constant over time. When estimating non-discretionary 
accruals, she first introduced a cross sectional regression to capture an average 
amount of earnings adjustment justified by the market. Dechow and Sloan (1991) 
further modified Jones model and developed an industry model, which assumes 
that variation in the determinants of non-discretionary accruals are common across 
firms in the same industry. Thereby, the cross sectional regression used in their 
model is industry specific. Dechow, Sloan and Seeney (1995) examined the Healy 
model (1985), DeAngelo model (1986), Jones model (1991) and the Industry 
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model and found that the Industry model (1991) exhibits the most power in 
detecting earnings management. In Teoh et al. (1998), the modified Jones model is 
employed only that in their study, discretionary current accruals, instead of 
discretionary total accruals, are used as earnings management estimates.  In these 
models, accruals are calculated using items from balance sheet and the legitimacy 
of using a balance sheet approach has become increasingly controversial. Hribar 
and Collins (2002) compared the results of earnings management calculation using 
a balance sheet approach with those calculated directly from cash flow statements. 
They argued that the earnings management estimates obtained using balance sheet 
method is contaminated and biased upwards. Kothari, Leone, and Wasley (2005) 
suggested to match discretionary accruals with firms performance and showed that 
performance-matched discretionary accruals are more reliable in inferring a firm's 
earnings management. 
A more recently developed approach is the so-called "Test of Distribution 
of Reported Earnings and Accruals" approach. These studies examine the 
distribution of reported earnings to assess whether there is any evidence of 
earnings management.5 These studies found that there is a higher than expected 
frequency of firms with slightly positive earnings and a lower than expected 
frequency of firms with slightly negative earnings. One advantage of this approach 
is the avoidance of calculate accruals, and therefore sidestep the problem with 
whether a balance sheet approach or cash flow approach should be used. But at the 
same time it also becomes one the main shortcomings as this approach doesn't 
provide a clear understanding of the steps that companies take to increase reported 
earnings. 
                                                            
5 See, e.g., Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) and Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser (1999). 
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2.3 Seasoned bond offerings and market reaction 
Existing literatures on the stock price changes in response to public debt 
offerings provide confounding results. As a primary financing method, public debt 
offering alters a company's capital structure, or to put more specifically, it 
increases a company's leverage. The earliest literatures found positive relationship 
between the increase in a firm’s leverage level and stock price reactions to the 
announcement of such capital structure altering issuance. For example, Masulis 
(1983) discovered that a firm’s stock price changes in the same direction as the 
changes in its debt to equity ratio. And he argues that “this evidence was shown to 
be consistent with tax based models of optimal capital structure and leverage 
induced wealth transfers across security classes as well as with information effects 
concerning firm value which are positively related to changes in firm debt level.”  
However, later studies found contradictory results that do not support these 
theories. Smith (1986) showed that there is a negative 0.26 percent average stock 
price reaction in response to straight debt offerings. Although the negative 
abnormal return is not statistically significant, it already differs from the positive 
reaction to such issuance recorded in previous literatures. Eckbo (1986) looked at 
the valuation effect of corporate debt offerings and also found that straight debt 
offerings have non-positive price effects. What is counter-intuitive in the findings 
of their study is that the abnormal stock returns are more negative for those firms 
that have indicated the usage of the raised funds as to finance capital expenditure 
program than those that haven’t made any specific indication. Another main result 
of their study is that convertible debt offerings have a negative impact on the 
issuing firm’s common stock price. This finding is consistently supported by later 
researches on the same topic with different sample. These two results are mostly 
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descriptive or can be taken as empirical evidence for or against certain theories. 
The result that has more indicative significance is probably the last one. They 
showed that there is no detectable statistical relation between the valuation effect 
of debt offerings and 1) the size of the offering, 2) the increase in the firm’s debt-
related tax shield, 3) the rating of the bonds, 4) the abnormal change in the issuing 
firm’s earnings in the period immediately following the offering or 5) the offering 
method. This makes it more justifiable to not worry about controlling different 
characteristics of debt when studying valuation effect of bond offerings in the 
future.  
Lakshmi (1991) again looked at the valuation effect of bond issuing. What 
makes their study interesting is that they divided debt into two groups by their 
underlying level of risks and then examined the stock market reaction to the 
issuance of these two different types of corporate debts. Firstly they showed that 
announcements of straight debt offerings are not associated with a significant 
stock price reaction. And in order to examine stock reaction to bond issuance with 
different risk profiles, they used bond rating as a proxy for the risk levels of 
underlying bond. Their study showed that there is no significant difference 
between the stock valuation effects of safe and risky debt issuances. Similar to 
Eckbo (1986), they also found that abnormal returns at the announcement of 
straight debt issues are not significantly related to firm size. 
The literatures discussed above didn't distinguish initial public debt 
offerings from seasoned bond offering. Argued by Datta et al (2000), initial public 
debt offerings have some unique features as it represents a major shift in a firm's 
financing policy by both extending debt maturity and altering the public-private 
mix. They documented a significantly negative stock price response to debt IPO 
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announcements. In their robustness check they showed that the negative stock 
price response is invariant to the default risk of the issue, the effect of the debt IPO 
on leverage, the industry in which the issuing firm operates (industrial and 
financial), and the purpose of the offer. The price reaction at the announcement of 
the second and third public bond offerings is not significantly different from zero. 
And in addition, they also found that firms with less information asymmetry and 
firms with higher growth opportunities experience a less adverse stock price 
response.   
Recognizing this difference between initial debt offering and seasoned 
bond offering, in this study, seasoned bond offering is selected as the event to 
examine the importance of corporate governance due to a larger amount of SBOs 
as opposed to IBOs.  
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Chapter 3 
Hypothesis Development 
As reviewed in the previous chapter, firms have various incentives to 
manipulate earnings. Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998b) recorded aggressive 
positive earnings management for firms making seasoned public offerings as an 
attempt to achieve better pricing in the stock market. They also find similar 
results for inital public offerings (Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998a)). Gong, Louis, 
and Sun (2008) found that firms aggressively manage their earnings downwards 
before making an open market repurchase so that the cost of the repurchase can 
be lowered. Security offerings and purchases are essentially market transactions 
and as one party in the transaction, it’s only natural to find firms trying to obtain 
better pricing by dressing up (or down as in stock repurchasing) the "products", 
in this case, the firm itself.  
One such transaction is seasoned bond offerings. Ever since the early 
1900s, industrial corporate bonds have been given quality ratings. Pervious 
literatures have shown that the bond yield is negatively related to such ratings. 
For example, Caouette, Altman, and Narayanan (1998) report that the average B-
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rated firm pays about 150 basis points more than does the average double-B rated 
firm. And this gives a high incentive to firms to obtain a better bond rating. One 
important factor in rating debt security is the firm's ability to generate future cash 
flows, which in turn would be examined based on the firm's profitability in the 
past.  In Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, and LaFond (2006), credit ratings are proved 
empirically to be positively related to the return on asset ratio and interest 
coverage ratio, which are both a function of a company’s net income. This 
coincides with the results of previous literatures in the same field.6 Therefore, 
when debt-issuing firms try to dress up as a good company, one of the gimmicks 
under their disposal is to manipulate accounting incomes upwards. As 
documented in Caton, Chiyachantan, Chua and Goh (1998), bond issuing firms 
display a significant earnings management in the year of the offering. Using a 
different sample period and sample firms, this study would also look at the 
earnings management effort surrounding seasoned bond offerings and in null 
form, Hypothesis 1 is as follows: 
Hypothesis 1: Earnings management activities are insignificant 
surrounding seasoned bond offerings. 
The quality of financial reporting has been gaining more attention since 
the collapse of Enron and WorldCom. What investors demand from public 
companies is a fair disclosure of its operating and financial conditions. And one 
of the reasons that corporate governance is requested to be in place and well 
implemented is to ensure the achievement of such goals, because, as argued 
                                                            
6 For example, see Ziebart and Reiter (1992).  
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earlier, management would always have incentives to distort the accounting 
figures and mislead the market for the benefit of their own.  
It's fairly intuitive to assume that in companies with good corporate 
governance, the management are subject to more constraints and are more likely 
to be prevented from applying their discretions in a way that could be detrimental 
to the outside investors. On contrary, in poorly governed firms where supervision 
and oversight are rarely in place and where managers are so entrenched that 
they're practically free to conduct the business in whichever way they feel like, 
malpractice can be quite common. Elder and Hsieh (2007) studied Taiwan stock 
market and found that lower likelihood of earnings management is associated 
with good corporate governance, indicated by the independence of supervisors, 
financial expertise of independent directors, and voluntary formation of 
independent directorship (supervisor-ship). Xie and Davidson (2001) showed that 
board and audit committee members with corporate or financial backgrounds are 
associated with firms that have smaller discretionary current accruals. Similarly, 
in this study, I posit that in the event of corporate bond offering, firms with 
relatively poor corporate governance practice will display a higher earnings 
management effort. Hypothesis 2, therefore, is as given in the following null 
form: 
Hypothesis 2: Earnings management activities surrounding seasoned 
bond offerings are insignificantly different among firms 
with different corporate governance qualities. 
After examining how managers' behaviors differ among firms with 
different corporate governance, I turn to the difference corporate governance 
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make on the investment decision-making process of shareholders. When a firm 
announces the bond offering to the market, how would investors react? What is 
the overall stock price change? What affects their reactions? Is corporate 
governance one of the factors that investors take into account when responding to 
the bond offering announcement? There is a voluminous amount of literatures 
examining the stock valuation effect of straight debt offerings but only providing 
confounding results. No consensus has been achieved on how market reacts to 
such an event. This study contributes to this field by introducing corporate 
governance as one of the factors in determining market reaction in response to 
SBOs. In null form, hypothesis 3 and 4 are as follows: 
Hypothesis 3: Stock market reaction immediately following the 
announcement of seasoned bond offering is insignificant. 
Hypothesis 4: Stock market reaction following the announcement of 
seasoned bond offering is insignificantly different among 
firms with different corporate governance practice. 
In Jensen and Mecklings (1976), it's argued that the agency cost of a firm 
decreases as it increases its leverage. In other words, it means that a debt 
financing and equity financing have completely different implications for 
investors of firms with different corporate governance structure. When a firm 
issues debt, it commits itself to a series of future cash flows and the failure to 
meet any of these cash flows would directly lead to the firm's bankruptcy, in 
which case, the manager will lose its job. And as a firm’s leverage goes up, debt 
holders would have more claims over the residual assets of a firm when bankrupt 
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and whatever is left for its shareholders, including the manager, becomes smaller. 
Thus, a debt offering decreases the agency cost by better aligning the interest of 
the managers and outsider shareholders. As stated in Jensen (1989), "over-
leveraging creates the atmosphere managers require to slash unsound investment 
programs, shrink overhead, and dispose of assets that are more valuable outside 
the company." This effect is expected to be bigger for firms with weak corporate 
governance structure. With this reasoning, it's expected to see a positive market 
reaction to the seasoned bond offerings for firms with poor corporate governance.  
Another argument for poorly governed firms to have a positive market 
reaction in response to its seasoned bond offering is a signaling effect. This goes 
back to the question why managers that are "happily" entrenched would want to 
choose debt financing over equity financing in the first place? After all, they are 
subjecting themselves to more supervision and pressure from potential 
bankruptcies. By issuing debt, managers can stay as entrenched as they feel like 
while obtaining the capital they need at the same time. One thing that could 
compete with the supervision brought in by a debt issuing is a direct deduction in 
managers’ wealth. And here goes one possible explanation for the selection of 
debt financing over equity financing: the company's stocks are currently under-
priced. And if the firm issues equity instead of debt in this case, there is a wealth 
transfer from its existing shareholders (including the manager) to the new ones. 
Therefore, when firms that have a weak corporate governance practice announce 
a debt issuing, the market may interpret it as a signal, indicating that shares of 
these firms are currently undervalued.  
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Chapter 4 
Data and Sample Selection 
The bond offering data are obtained from Securities Data Corporation 
(SDC). 3630 companies are identified as having had a bond offering between 
January 1st, 1990 and December 31st, 2006. Data provided by the Investor 
Responsibility Research Centre (IRRC) in their Corporate Takeover Defences 
(Rosenbaum (1990), (1993), (1995), (1998), (2000), (2002), (2004)) are used to 
determine the number of protective provisions employed by a given firm and 
then decide their Entrenchment Index using the aforementioned method. 2413 
companies are covered in the IRRC during the same period. Since Corporate 
Takeover Defences is not published annually and the number of provisions 
employed by individual companies can change, I limit the analysis to company 
issuance included in IRRC as of the date of the issuance. This results in a sample 
of 1707 company issues in this period. 
Three criteria are applied in further selecting the data. Firstly, because of 
the high frequency of bond issuing and their unique characteristic, companies in 
the finance industry are excluded. Those in the utility industry are also left out due 
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to its heavy regulation. Secondly, the first bond issuance of each company is 
deleted from the dataset to make sure that there are no initial bond offerings 
involved. Lastly, if a company has more than one bond issuance within 3 years, 
only the first one is retained. Among all the companies that are left, only 188 have 
stock return data on the Centre for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and 
accounting data on Standard & Poor’s Compustat. This gives a 371 company 
issues in the final sample.  
Table 1 gives the distribution of company bond issuance during the sample 
period. As can be seen from the table, the bond issuances spread quite evenly 
across the years. No particular year has a large concentration of bond offerings. 
 
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the sample of seasoned bond 
offering firms. In Panel A, note that sample companies are fairly large in terms of 
total assets, which has a mean (median) of $13.5 billion ($5.01 billion); capital 
expenditure averages at 6.6%; sample companies have an average leverage ratio of 
29%; given the large value of assets, the average ROA is only 6%. Panel B shows 
the industry distribution of sample firms as classified by the 2-digit SIC code 
obtained from Compustat. Firms are clustered in the broadly defined 
manufacturing industry while there are only 2 firms in the agricultural industry. 
 
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
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Following Bebchek et al. (2004), each company is assigned an 
entrenchment index according to the number of protective provisions it adopted. 
Companies whose entrenchment index equals to zero or one are grouped together 
as E-index portfolio 1, which has the strongest corporate governance practice 
according to this measurement. Companies with entrenchment index equaling to 
two are three, are divided into separate groups as E-index portfolio 2 and 3, which 
have average governance practice. Firms whose entrenchment index equals to 4 or 
5 are grouped together due to the small number of companies with a high 
entrenchment index and they are placed in E-index portfolio 4. Panel A in table 3 
shows the frequency distribution of E-index in the sample. About 11% of the 
companies have an E index of zero; companies with an E index equal to 1 to 4 
takes up around 20% of the sample each; only 2% of the company has an E index 
of 5; there are no companies in the sample that has an entrenchment index that 
equals to 6. 
 Following Gompers et al. (2003), each company is assigned a Governance 
Index according to the numbers of protective provisions employed. Companies 
whose G-index falls into the range of 3 to 8 are grouped into G-index portfolio 1; 
companies with G-index equal to 9 or then are grouped into G-index portfolio 2; 
eleven and twelve into G-index portfolio 3; 13 and above into G-index portfolio 4. 
There are no companies in the sample that has a G-index that equals to one or two 
or seventeen. Panel B in table 3 gives the frequency distribution of G-index in the 
sample. 
 E-index will be used as the primary proxy for corporate governance quality 
of sample firms while results of similar tests using G-index as corporate 
governance proxy will also be provided. 
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[Insert Table 3 Here] 
 
Table 4 gives the distribution of company bond issuance among different 
corporate governance portfolio. As can be seen from the table, the number of bond 
issuance of different portfolios does not differ greatly from each other and the 
average bond issuances per company of different portfolios are quite comparable. 
No particular corporate governance portfolio displays an extremely large or small 
amount of total bond issuance. 
 
[Insert Table 4 Here] 
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Chapter 5 
Methodology 
5.1 Earnings management 
In the U.S., listed firms follow the Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (GAAP) to prepare their financial statements. As all principles, GAAP 
is not a set of hard solid rules that leave no room for discretion. In fact, a general 
need for discretion is widely recognized and that’s where the “accrual” system 
walks in. In order to make a company’s financial statements more accurately 
reflect its real operation performance, managers are allowed to record revenues 
and expenses in the books even if the actual cash hasn’t been changed hands. The 
most often cited examples would be accounts receivables, which reflects the 
revenue from goods sold or service rendered but the cash payment hasn’t been 
made yet; accounts payable follows the same circle with an opposite direction. 
Another commonly cited example would be the selection of depreciation methods. 
A switch from straight line method to accelerating method would normally result 
in a decrease in the company earnings of current year and vise visa. Used properly, 
accruals can indeed enhance the precision of a firm’s financial statements in 
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displaying its operating and financial performance. However, this is only one side 
of the coin. The flipside would be the freedom granted to the management to 
manipulate earnings reported to the public, serving all kinds of intentions. And 
therefore, a reasonable proxy for earnings management would be the abnormal 
accruals, which is the part that cannot be justified by the ordinary activities of a 
firm within a certain industry.  
Looked at by the underlying motivation of accruals recorded, it can be 
classified into discretional and non-discretional accruals. Non-discretional accrual 
is the part that’s supposed to happen according to GAAP so that the financial 
conditions of a company within a specified period can be best reflected. 
Discretional accruals, on the other hand, are only generated when the managers 
want and need them to. To put more blatantly, a manager may have an incentive to 
defer the recognition of revenues earned so that the earnings can be put off to 
future periods if a general tax deduction is known to be put in place soon 
(Guenther, 1994), or if the company is going to have a seasoned equity offering, 
the manager may want to defer the recognition of expenses incurred as an effort to 
increase current earnings so that the shares can be sold with a better price. (Teoh et 
al., 1998a) Discretional accruals, therefore, can be considered as a proxy for the 
magnitude of a firm’s earnings management practice. 
Looked at by time horizon, total accruals can be divided into two 
categories – long-term accruals and short-term accruals, or current accruals. Long 
term accruals are accruals involved in long term assets. The aforementioned 
depreciation is an example of long term accruals. Short-term accruals are revenue 
or expense recognitions happened in the current fiscal year. Apparently, managers 
have more control over current accruals as opposed to long term accruals. 
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Especially in an event as seasoned bond offering, which is considered as a 
commonly-employed financing approach, managers are expected to adjust current 
accruals to achieve their earnings management purpose rather than long term 
accruals. It’s hard to believe that managers would switch to another depreciation 
method every time it issues corporate bond. Besides, manipulation in current 
accruals is more difficult to detect whereas a change in depreciation method is a 
rather bald movement and the managers may have a hard time justifying it. Thus, 
in the study, I will use discretionary current accruals as the proxy for earnings 
management of issuing firms. 
Net income in a company’s income statements equals to the sum of cash 
flow from operations and total accruals.      
ܰ݁ݐ ܫ݊ܿ݋݉݁ ൌ ܥܽݏ݄ ܨ݈݋ݓ ݂ݎ݋݉ ܱ݌݁ݎܽݐ݅݋݊ݏ ൅ ܶ݋ݐ݈ܽ ܣܿܿݎݑ݈ܽݏ 
 And therefore, total accruals (TAC) equals to net income minus cash flow 
from operations. As reasoned above, total accruals can be divided into long term 
accruals (LA) and current accruals (CA). 
ܶܣܥ ൌ ܰ݁ݐ ܫ݊ܿ݋݉݁ െ ܥܽݏ݄ ܨ݈݋ݓ ݂ݎ݋݉ ܱ݌݁ݎܽݐ݅݋݊ݏ 
         ൌ ܥܣ ൅ ܮܣ 
 The part I’ll be looking at in the study, current accruals, is reflected as the 
sum of changes in a firm’s current assets and current liabilities: 
ܥܣ ൌ ∆ܣܥܶ െ ∆ܥܪܧ െ ∆ܮܥܶ ൅ ∆ܦܦ1 
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where ∆ܣܥܶ ൌ the change in current assets during period t (Compustat item 4); 
∆ܥܪܧ ൌ the change in cash and cash equivalents during period t (Compustat item 
1); ∆ܮܥܶ ൌ the change in current liabilities during period t (Compustat item 5); 
∆ܦܦ1 ൌ the change in current maturity of long term debt (Compustat item 44). 
Following Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998a), I use a modified Jones (1991) 
model to estimate discretionary current accruals, i.e., the earnings management of 
a given firm. It argues that a company’s current accruals should be linked to the 
changes in its sales revenue, as given by the following equation: 
ܥܣ௝௧
ܶܣ௝,௧ିଵ
ൌ ܽ଴ ቆ
1
ܶܣ௝,௧ିଵ
ቇ ൅ ܽଵ ቆ
∆ܵܣܮܧ ௝ܵ௧
ܶܣ௝,௧ିଵ
ቇ ൅ ߝ௝௧ 
where j firms belong to the same two-digit SIC  group but excluding the issuing 
company; ∆ܵܣܮܧ ௝ܵ௧ (Compustat item 12) is the change in sales of firm j in year t, 
ܥܣ௝௧ is the current accruals of firm j in year t; ܶܣ௝,௧ିଵ is the total assets of  firm j 
in year t-1 (Compustat item 6). The equation is scaled by the total assets as of the 
end of previous year to control for the size effect. To estimate the coefficients 
ܽ଴ and ܽଵ, cross sectional regressions are carried out within each industry and in 
each year from year -2 to year 0, where year zero is the year in which the issuing 
company made the bond offering. Then non discretionary current accruals 
(NDCA), the part that can be justified by the sales changes in the firms according 
to its peers in the same industry, are estimated using the following equation: 
ܰܦܥܣ௜௧ ൌ ܽ଴ෞ ቆ
1
ܶܣ௜,௧ିଵ
ቇ ൅ ܽଵෞሺ
∆ܵܣܮܧ ௜ܵ௧ െ ܴܧܥܥܪ௜௧
ܶܣ௜,௧ିଵ
ሻ 
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where ܰܦܥܣ௜௧ is the estimated non discretional current accruals for issuing firm i 
in year t; ܴܧܥܥܪ௜௧ is the change in accounts receivables (Compustat item 302); ܽ଴ෞ 
and ܽଵෞ are the coefficients estimations. The changes in accounts receivables are 
subtracted from changes in sales to allow for credit sales manipulation by the 
issuing company, which might introduce in a loose policy on credit sales to gear 
up the earnings preceding the offering year. The discretionary accruals, or 
earnings management (EM) is the balance of actual accruals after subtracting the 
non discretionary portion: 
ܧܯ௜௧ ൌ
ܥܣ௜௧
ܶܣ௜,௧ିଵ
െ ܰܦܥܣ௜௧  
 where ܧܯ௜௧ is the earnings management of firm i in year t. 
 To summarize, the discretionary current accrual is selected as the proxy for 
the earnings management of a firm making a bond offering. To calculate a firm’s 
discretionary current accruals, its non-discretionary accruals are estimated first. 
Non-discretionary accruals are considered to be determined by the changes in 
sales and cross-sectional regressions are carried out within each industry to 
estimate the coefficients for a firm in this particular industry. And then the 
discretionary current accruals, i.e., earnings management of a firm is calculated by 
subtracting its estimated non discretionary accruals from total current accruals.  
5.2 Market reactions 
 The second part of this paper studies the market reaction to the bond 
offering announcement of companies with different corporate governance practice. 
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Here, I employ the standard event study approach and use stock return data from 
CRSP to calculate the stock abnormal returns over the seven days surrounding the 
seasoned bond offering announcement and the cumulative abnormal returns over a 
three day event window (-1, 1). The event day, i.e. day 0 is defined as the filing 
date data downloaded from SDC7. 
 The following equation is used to calculate the abnormal returns of each 
company, 
ܣܴ௜ ൌ ܴ௜ – ܧሺܴ௜ሻ 
where ܣܴ௜  is the abnormal return of company i, ܴ௜   is the realized return and 
ܧሺܴ௜ሻ is the expected return. The expected return is calculated using the simple 
market return model given below, 
ܧሺܴ௜ሻ ൌ ߙపෝ ൅ ߚప෡ሺܴ௠ሻ 
where ߙపෝ  and ߚప෡  are the estimated coefficients for the simple stock return model of 
firm i, and ܴ௠ is the value weighted market stock return. Therefore an estimation 
period that is least affected by the event under study needs to be selected to 
properly estimate the model coefficients by running the following time series 
regression, 
ܴ௜ ൌ ߙ௜ ൅ ߚ௜ሺܴ௠ሻ ൅ ߝ௜ 
                                                            
7 To ensure that the filing date is the first announcement of the debt offering, I use Factiva to check whether 
there is a separate announcement of the debt offering before the filing date. In the sample, there are only 14 
companies out of 371 that announced the issuance before the press release of the filing. I delete these 
companies due to the uncertainty of event date. 
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 In this paper, I estimate market model parameters using daily stock returns 
from day -245 to day -51. Within each E-index portfolio, I average abnormal 
returns by day and cumulate them over the three-day event window (-1, 1).
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Chapter 6 
Results and Analysis 
6. 1 Earnings management  
I posit that before the bond issuing, companies would have incentives to 
manipulate the earnings upwards in order to lower the financing cost. And 
companies with a high entrenchment index will display a higher magnitude of 
earnings management because the corporate governance in these companies is 
more to the advantage of managers and they therefore enjoy more discretion. 
Hence, I look at the abnormal current accruals of issuing firms in different E-index 
portfolios in year -2, -1, 0, 1, and 2, where year 0 is the bond offering year. Note 
that there is normally one year lag between a company’s fiscal year and the 
calendar year. Therefore if a company issues debt in 2000, the earnings figure for 
that year would only appear in year 2001, which won’t contribute much to a 
company’s bond rating even if manipulated. Combined with the fact that most 
companies do not plan their bond offerings 2 years in advance, earnings 
management efforts are expected to appear more likely in year -2 and -1.  
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The results are given in table 5. Portfolios of sample firms are arranged 
across the columns of the table with the first two columns containing results for 
the full sample and subsequent columns containing results for each entrenchment 
portfolio from the most entrenched firms (E index=4, 5, or 6) to the least 
entrenched ones (E index=0 or 1). 
 
[Insert Table 5 Here] 
 
As is shown, for the full sample the earnings management activities in the 
3 years leading up to the issuing year and the 2 years after are not significantly 
different from zero. However, after divided into different corporate governance 
portfolios, companies that have an E-index equal to 4, 5 and 6 display significantly 
positive discretionary current accruals in year -2 and -1. Two years before the 
actual bond offering, companies that fall into the highest E-index portfolio have an 
average earnings management of 0.74%, which is larger than the average earnings 
management for any other portfolios by at least a factor of 2 and is the only 
statistically significant portfolio EM. This difference is much larger in year -1. 
While companies in other governance portfolios have almost zero EM in year -1, 
those in the highest E-index portfolio present a 0.88% earnings management, 
which is statistically significant below a 5% level. During year 0, no portfolio 
display an EM that is significantly different from zero, which is reasonable, since 
there is normally a lag between a company’s fiscal year and the calendar year and 
thus it’s considered a bit too late to manipulate earnings in the year when the bond 
is being offered. 
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Results in table 5 show that firms with the weakest corporate governance 
structure aggressively manage their earnings upwards in the 2 years prior to the 
bond offering; other firms with relatively better governance practice do not display 
this pattern. To further examine whether the earnings management effort among 
firms with different governance quality differ significantly from each other, I carry 
out a one way non-parametric test to see whether the average earnings 
management of E-index portfolio 4 is significantly larger than other 3 groups. 
Table 6 compares the earnings management effort of E-Index portfolio 1, 2 
and 3 with that of E-Index portfolio 4 in the five years surrounding the bond 
offering year. With rare exceptions (year 0, with E-index portfolio 1 and E-index 
portfolio 3, neither is statistically significant), in almost every case, the earnings 
management effort of the most poorly governed firms is larger than those of the 
better governed firms. And in year -1, in which we expect to see the strongest 
earnings management effort in the most entrenched firms, the difference is 
significantly larger than zero when compared with the other three groups. The 
difference is especially stronger between the best governed firms and the worst 
ones. 
 
[Insert Table 6 Here] 
 
The result coincides with the hypothesis that managers in the highest E-
index portfolio are more entrenched and has more discretion and when these 
companies are offering debt, they have more freedom to manipulate the earnings 
so as to increase the bond rating and therefore lower the cost of financing. As 
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predicted, this earnings management behavior is observed in the two years leading 
up to the actual issuing year.  
To test more directly on the relationship between a firm’s earnings 
management effort and its pre-issuing corporate governance structure, I carry out a 
regression analysis with earnings management being dependent variable and E-
index as explanatory variable, while controlling for other potentially important 
independent variables. The regression equation is given below: 
ܧܯ௜,௝ ൌ ߙ௜,௝ ൅ ߚ௜,௝ሺܧ݀ݑ݉௜ሻ ൅෍ߛ௞,௜,௝ܥ௞,௜,௝ିଵ
௄
௞ୀଵ
൅ ߝ௜,௝ 
where  ܧܯ௜,௝ is the earnings management effort of firm i in year j; ܧ݀ݑ݉௜ 
indicates membership in a specific E-index portfolio; ܥ௞,௜,௝ିଵ denotes each of K 
different control variables of firm i in year j-1. 
My main interest in estimating the above equation is to find out whether 
the strong earnings management effort displayed by firms in the lowest corporate 
governance layer is indeed associated with their poor corporate governance quality. 
Therefore, ܧ݀ݑ݉௜ equals to 1 if the firm’s entrenchment index equals to 4, 5 or 6, 
otherwise ܧ݀ݑ݉௜ would be assigned a value of zero.  
When selecting control variables, I include a firm’s leverage ratio and 
capital expenditure deflated by total assets. As argued by Jensen and Meckling 
(1976), a firm can decrease its agency cost by increasing the use of debt and 
therefore, by introducing in leverage ratio we control for already existing 
constraints on agency costs. Capital expenditure is included to reflect how strongly 
a company is in need for new capital at a low cost, which may in turn increase its 
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incentive to manage earnings. The value of control variables are measured at the 
end of the fiscal year prior to the relative year of the underlying earnings 
management. As discussed previously, the earnings management effort of issuing 
firms are expected to be most strongly in the 2 years prior to the bond offering. 
Therefore we regress the estimated earnings management in year -1 and -2 on the 
above listed variables with their value measured at year -2 and -3 respectively.  
ܧܯ௜,ିଵ ൌ ߙ௜ ൅ ߚ௜ሺܧ݀ݑ݉௜ሻ ൅ ߛଵ,௜൫ܮܧ ௜ܸ,ିଶ൯ ൅ ߛଶ,௜൫ܥܣܲ ௜ܺ,ିଶ൯ 
ܧܯ௜,ିଶ ൌ ߙ௜ ൅ ߚ௜ሺܧ݀ݑ݉௜ሻ ൅ ߛଵ,௜൫ܮܧ ௜ܸ,ିଷ൯ ൅ ߛଶ,௜൫ܥܣܲ ௜ܺ,ିଷ൯ 
where  ܧܯ௜,ିଵ  is the earnings management of firm i in year -1; ܧ݀ݑ݉௜ 
indicates membership in a specific E-index portfolio; ܮܧ ௜ܸ,ିଶ is the leverage ratio 
of firm i in year -2; ܥܣܲ ௜ܺ,ିଶ is the capital expenditure of firm i in year -2. The 
notions are similar for the other equation. 
The regression results are shown in table 7. Earnings management 
estimates in year -1 and -2 are both positively related to the Edum, the dummy 
variable that equals to 1 if the firm’s entrenchment index is larger than 4, and are 
both statistically significant. This gives direct evidence supporting the hypothesis 
that the earnings management activities of bond issuing firms are negatively 
associated with their corporate governance quality. The worse a firm’s corporate 
governance is, the more earnings management activities it engages in during the 
two years prior to the bond offering. Note that, this relationship is statistically 
stronger for earnings management estimates in year -2, implying that not only do 
firms with poor corporate governance manage their earnings more aggressively, 
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they also start the earnings management activity earlier than firms with relatively 
sound corporate governance. 
 
[Insert Table 7 Here] 
 
Similar tests are carried out using G-index as a proxy for a firm’s corporate 
governance practice. Results are given in table 8, table 9 and table 10. As can be 
seen from the tables, the results using G-index as corporate governance proxy are 
qualitatively similar to those using E-index as governance proxy, although some of 
the results are not as significant. 
 
[Insert Table 8 Here] 
[Insert Table 9 Here] 
[Insert Table 10 Here] 
 
In summary, I examined earnings management activity of firms making 
seasoned bond offerings and found that managers in poorly governed firms 
manipulate the earnings of their companies more aggressively and more ahead of 
time. In the two years prior to the bond offering year, firms in the highest 
entrenchment index group managed their earnings upwards by 0.74% and 0.78% 
respectively, as opposed to the non-significant earnings management of firms with 
better governance structure. This provides direct evidence supporting the 
importance of corporate governance and its implications on how firms conduct 
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their day-to-day business. To put more clearly, firms with a relatively sound 
corporate governance structure are less likely to engage in inappropriate activities 
such as earnings management as an attempt to mislead the market and its investors. 
6.2 Stock market reactions 
Table 11 presents the results of analysis on stock market reactions. Using 
the methodology discussed previously, I calculated the stock abnormal returns of 
issuing firms during the seven days surrounding the announcement day and 
cumulated them over a three day event window of (-1, 1). Portfolios of sample 
firms are arranged across the columns of the table with the first two columns 
containing results for the full sample and subsequent columns containing results 
for each entrenchment portfolio from the most entrenched firms (E index=4, 5, or 
6) to the least entrenched ones (E index=0 or 1). Single day abnormal returns are 
in the main body of the table. 
 
[Insert Table 11 Here] 
 
Over the three day event window, the cumulative abnormal return of the 
full sample is not significantly different from zero, which is consistent with 
previous literature. Among the four governance portfolios, only the one with the 
highest E index showed a positive 0.63% cumulative abnormal return, which is 
larger than that of any other government portfolio and is three times greater than 
the second largest. And it is also the only abnormal return that is statistically 
significant at a level below 5%. As discussed in the previous section, issuing debt 
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can reduce the agency problem of corporations on two levels. Firstly, as argued in 
Jensen and Mecklings (1976), one way to decrease the cost of agency problem is 
to increase the firm leverages. By creating a crisis atmosphere attached to over-
leveraged firms, managers would have incentives to create value for the firm and 
thereby their interest and shareholders’ interest are better aligned. And even when 
firms are not over-leveraged, the commitment to pay a series of future cash flows 
would also serve as a pressure for the managers to perform so that their firms 
won’t go bankrupt. And thus shareholders of these firms would favor a seasoned 
bond offering and react positively. For companies whose corporate governance is 
already very sound, and therefore have a relatively low cost of agency problem, 
the introduction of additional debt will not have as much impact as on those badly 
governed firms. In fact, for shareholders of these firms with good corporate 
governance, agency problem is no longer a major concern. And the market 
reactions to the announcement of seasoned bond offering of these firms are 
expected to be mixed, as supported by the results shown in the table.   
  Looking more closely at the abnormal returns of each portfolio in each day, 
for the two portfolios with a lower E index, nearly all the abnormal returns are not 
significantly different from zero; for companies with an E index equal to 3, the 
results are quite mixed: in day 0, there is a negative abnormal return of -0.39% and 
in day 1 there is a positive one of 0.28%; only for firms with the highest E index, 
there is a relatively consistent positive abnormal returns from day -1 onwards, 
where the abnormal return in day 0 is 0.38%, which is the highest positive 
abnormal return among all the companies during the entire period.  
To test more directly on the hypothesis that investors of firms with weak 
corporate governance structure react positively to the announcement of seasoned 
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bond offering as they see a potential decrease in these firms’ agency problems, I 
carry out a regression analysis using the following equation: 
ܥܣܴ௜ ൌ ߙ௜ ൅ ߚ௜ሺܧ݀ݑ݉௜ሻ ൅෍ߛ௞,௜ܥ௞,௜
௄
௞ୀଵ
൅ ߝ௜,௝ 
where ܥܣܴ௜  is the 3-day cumulative abnormal return; ܧ݀ݑ݉௜  indicates 
membership in a specific E-index portfolio; ܥ௞,௜,௝ିଵ denotes each of K different 
control variables; and i denotes different firms. In an effort to more fully specify 
the regression model, I include several control variables in the analysis. First, I 
assign a dummy variable CONTAM, which equals one for firms that had a 
confounding news announcement (such as merger and acquisition, earnings or 
dividend announcement etc) during the 7 days surrounding the earnings 
management. In the sample, there are 137 companies have had such a news 
announcement. Secondly, I include the average earnings management effort 
during the two years prior to the bond offering year to control any potential effect 
this abnormal activity might have on the market reaction. As discussed the section 
of hypothesis development, I posit that market reaction to seasoned bond offerings 
of firms with poor corporate governance structure may be negatively related to the 
firms’ pre-existing leverage ratio because if a poorly governed firm is already 
highly-leveraged, the additional debt is expected to not have much effect in 
reducing the underlying agency problem. Therefore, a firms’ leverage ratio is also 
included as a control variable for the full sample regression. According to Jensen’s 
free cash flow theory, when firms offering security to the market, the stock price 
change will depend on the net effect of the offering on the company’s free cash 
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flows. If a company issues debt to buy back stocks, the market reaction is expected 
to be positive. Meanwhile, if a firm is believed to have sound investment projects 
the issuance of securities would also be positively received because the newly 
raised funds will be put into good use. Therefore I include a firm’s capital 
expenditure, return on assets and as control variables to reflect the investment 
activity and profitability of the issuing firms in the year prior to the bond offering. 
The firm’s leverage ratio and capital expenditure is measured at the end of the 
fiscal year prior to the offering. Return on assets ratio and sales are measured as 
the 3 year average leading up to the bond offering. Capital expenditure and sales 
are deflated by a firm’s total assets. The regression equation is given in specific 
terms below: 
ܥܣܴ௜ ൌ ߙ௜ ൅ ߚ௜ሺܧ݀ݑ݉௜ሻ ൅ ߛଵ,௜ሺܥܱܰܶܣܯ௜ሻ ൅ ߛଶ,௜ሺܧܯ௜ሻ ൅ ߛଷ,௜ሺܮܧ ௜ܸሻ
൅ ߛସ,௜ሺܥܣܲ ௜ܺሻ ൅ ߛହ,௜ሺܴܱܣ௜ሻ ൅ ߛ଺,௜ሺܵܣܮܧ௜ሻ ൅ ߝ௜ 
where ܥܣܴ௜  is the 3-day cumulative abnormal return; ܧ݀ݑ݉௜  indicates 
membership in a specific E-index portfolio; ܥܱܰܶܣܯ௜ equals one when a firm has 
a confounding news announcement in the 7 days surrounding the offering; ܧܯ௜ is 
the average earnings management estimates prior to the offering year; ܮܧ ௜ܸ is the 
issuing firm’s leverage ratio measured at the end of the fiscal year prior to the 
issuing; ܥܣܲ ௜ܺ is the capital expenditure deflated by total assets measured at the 
end of the fiscal year prior to the offering; ܴܱܣ௜ is the average return on assets 
ratio over the 3 years prior to the offering; ܵܣܮܧ௜  is the average sales over the 
same period deflated by total assets. 
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Results of the regression are shown in table 12. For the 5 models 
incorporating different control variables, Edum is the one and only explanatory 
variable with a positive estimated coefficient that are statistically significant below 
a 5% level. There is no detectable relationship between the valuation effects of a 
bond offering in the stock market with any other controlling variables. Model 1 is 
a univariate regression of Edum on the three-day announcement period CAR and 
indicates that, on average, firms with the weakest governance structure have 
abnormal returns 0.73% points higher than firms in the other 3 better governed 
firm portfolios. This is the primary finding in this section. The results support the 
hypothesis that the market reacts differently and positively to the seasoned bond 
offering announcements when the issuing firms’ managers have been overly 
entrenched. Model 2 shows that the pre-issuing earnings management efforts have 
little impact on the market reaction. Model 3 indicates that there is little influence 
of the confounding news released in the 7 days surrounding the announcement. 
Model 4 finds no significant connection between the market reactions to the 
issuing firms’ pre-existing leverage level for the full sample. Model 5 incorporates 
all the control variables and still only Edum has presented a positive association 
with the cumulative abnormal returns. 
 
[Insert Table 12 Here] 
 
Similar tests are carried out using G-index as the proxy for firms’ 
corporate governance practice. Results are given in table 13 and 14. As can be 
seen from the tables, the results using G-index as corporate governance proxy 
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are qualitatively similar to those using E-index as governance proxy, although 
some of the results are not as significant. 
 
[Insert Table 13 Here] 
[Insert Table 14 Here] 
 
In summary, I looked at the stock market reaction to firms making 
seasoned bond offerings, controlling for the corporate governance structure, 
among other firm-specific variables. I found that for the full sample, there are no 
significant reactions from the stock market. However, after divided into different 
groups according to firms’ corporate governance structure, a significant positive 
reaction is observed for firms with the weakest governance quality, which is 
consistent with the argument of Jensen and Meckling (1976) that the cost of 
agency problem decreases with the increase in firms’ leverage ratio. This effect 
is expected to be amplified for firms with notorious governance practice as this 
may be the investors’ biggest concern.8  The three-day cumulative abnormal 
return of firms in E-index portfolio 4 is 0.63%, which is the only significantly 
positive abnormal return documented of all firm portfolios and is 3 times larger 
than the second largest portfolio CAR. The result of regression analysis also 
gives a positive relationship between a firm’s CAR and the entrenchment index 
dummy, which equals to one for firms with an entrenchment index bigger than 4. 
This provides more direct evidence indicating that when investors make buy and 
sell decisions following the announcement of seasoned bond offering, corporate 
                                                            
8 See Jensen, M.C, 1989.  
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governance is one factor that would make an impact on this decision making 
process.  
Tests on the earnings management activity prior to seasoned bond 
offering and stock market reaction to the announcement of seasoned bond 
offering provide evidence verifying the importance of corporate governance by 
showing its influence on management behavior of firm executives and 
investment decision of investors. Firms that are poorly governed leave much 
room for their managers to cast discretion over operational decisions properly 
and inappropriately 
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Chapter 7 
Summary and Conclusion 
Corporate governance – does it matter? Why does it matter? How does it 
matter? We say something is of importance by pointing out its influence over 
other important things. And that’s how this article tries to answer the above 
questions. By examining the impact corporate governance has on the two most 
important participants in the market – firms and shareholders, I document 
evidence that is in favor of the main argument of this paper: the corporate 
governance structure of a firm is directly related to the way its managers conduct 
day-to-day business and it is also a factor that would affect investors’ decision 
making process, at least in the event of seasoned bond offering, which is used as 
a triggering event to carry out the underlying study.  
Previous literatures have documented positive earnings management for 
firms making seasoned bond offering. This article makes contribution by further 
examining the difference of earnings management activities of firms with 
different corporate governance structure and found that firms that have a weak 
corporate governance practice display greater earnings management effort in the 
2 years prior to the bond offering. This makes quite intuitive economic sense as 
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managers in poorly governed firms are more entrenched, face less restraints and 
basically free to conduct business any way they like, properly or inappropriately. 
When offering debt, a firm can lower the financial cost by obtaining a better 
bond rating. And one way that has been proved to be employed most commonly 
is earnings management. As shown in the regression analysis, there is a 
significantly negative relationship between an issuing firm’s earnings 
management magnitude and its corporate governance quality. Weakly governed 
firms manipulate their earnings more aggressively and more ahead of time. 
The second part of the study looks at how market interprets the seasoned 
bond offering of firms with different corporate governance structure. Existing 
literature has documented confounding results. By adding in the corporate 
governance quality of issuing firms, I found some interesting results. While 
market reactions to the bond issuing announcements of soundly governed firms 
are still quite mixed, the cumulative abnormal return for firms with the worst 
governance practice is significantly positive. This is consistent with the 
argument of Jensen and Meckling (1976), which posits that the increase in a 
firm’s leverage ratio would reduce the cost of its agency problem, which 
obviously is most severe in poorly governed firms.  
At first sight, it may seem counter-intuitive for the market to react 
positively to poorly governed firms but if we go back to the origin of corporate 
governance, it turns out to be not so surprising after all. External financing 
results in the separation of ownership and control, which in turn creates the 
agency problem. And to mitigate the problem, a set of corporate managing 
mechanisms are set up and promoted, which is what we now call corporate 
governance. It's established to protect the value and rights of shareholders, 
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especially outside shareholders who normally stay un-informed about the usage 
of their own money. As the shareholder of a poorly governed firm, one may be 
constantly worried over the potential misusage of their funds and therefore when 
the company announces a debt issuance, which may in turn improve its 
governance structure, investors would feel better protected and thereby react 
positively as it mitigates their biggest concern. However for firms which already 
have a sound governance structure, shareholders will not be much troubled by 
the agency problem, and thus the potential governance-related benefits attached 
to a bond issuing are unlikely to make an impact on these investors. Hence no 
positive reactions are observed for these companies.   
As an interesting extension, I also mention another alternative 
explanation for the positive market reaction to the bond offering of poorly 
governed firms, which is a signaling effect. Since bringing in debt will make 
managers subject to more constraints, the fact that a happily-entrenched manager 
chooses debt financing over equity financing may serve as a signal that the 
stocks of the firm are under-priced. Hence, a positive stock market reaction. 
However, this hypothesis is yet to be tested. Regression analysis also gives 
negative correlation between the 3-day cumulative abnormal return and a firm’s 
corporate governance structure. Compared with previous studies in this field, 
this paper contributes by providing a new stand to examine the problem and 
some new observations. 
To summarize, this study provided evidence for the importance of 
corporate governance and showed that it has a significant impact on 
management behavior in their daily business conduct and also serves as an 
important factor when investors make stock buy-and-sell decisions. 
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Appendix  
Corporate Governance Provisions 
This appendix describes the provisions used as components of the 
Governance Index, where the underlined provisions are employed in constructing 
the entrenchment index. 
1 Antigreenmail – Greenmail refers to the agreement between a large 
shareholder and a company in which the shareholder agrees to sell his stock back 
to the company, usually at a premium, in exchange for the promise not to seek 
control of the company for a specified period of time. Antigreenmail provisions 
prevent such arrangements unless the same repurchase offer is made to all 
shareholders or the transaction is approved by shareholders through a vote. They 
are thought to discourage accumulation of large blocks of stock because one 
source of exit for the stake is closed, but the net effect on shareholder wealth is 
unclear (Shleifer and Vishny (1986a)). Five states have specific antigreenmail 
laws, and two other states have “recapture of profits” laws, which enable firms to 
recapture raiders’ profits earned in the secondary market. We consider recapture of 
profits laws to be a version of antigreenmail laws (albeit a stronger one). The 
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antigreenmail category includes both firms with the provision and those 
incorporated in states with either antigreenmail or recapture of profits laws. 
2 Blank check preferred stock – This is preferred stock over which the 
board of directors has broad authority to determine voting, dividend, conversion, 
and other rights. While it can be used to enable a company to meet changing 
financial needs, it can also be used to implement poison pills or to prevent 
takeover by placement of this stock with friendly investors. Companies who have 
this type of preferred stock but who have required shareholder approval before it 
can be used as a takeover defense are not coded as having this provision in our 
data.  
3 Business Combination laws – These laws impose a moratorium on 
certain kinds of transactions (e.g., asset sales, mergers) between a large 
shareholder and the firm for a period usually ranging between three and five years 
after the shareholder’s stake passes a pre-specified (minority) threshold. 
4 & 5 Bylaw and Charter amendment limitations – These provisions 
limit shareholders’ ability to amend the governing documents of the corporation. 
This might take the form of a supermajority vote requirement for charter or bylaw 
amendments, total elimination of the ability of shareholders to amend the bylaws, 
or the ability of directors beyond the provisions of state law to amend the bylaws 
without shareholder approval. 
6 Classified board – A classified board is one in which the directors are 
placed into different classes and serve overlapping terms. Since only part of the 
board can be replaced each year, an outsider who gains control of a corporation 
may have to wait a few years before being able to gain control of the board. This 
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provision may also deter proxy contests, since fewer seats on the board are open 
each year. 
7 Compensation plans with changes in control provisions – These plans 
allow participants in incentive bonus plans to cash out options or accelerate the 
payout of bonuses should there be a change in control. The details may be a 
written part of the compensation agreement, or discretion may be given to the 
compensation committee. 
8 Director indemnification contracts – These are contracts between the 
company and particular officers and directors indemnifying them from certain 
legal expenses and judgments resulting from lawsuits pertaining to their conduct. 
Some firms have both “indemnification” in their bylaw/charter and these 
additional indemnification “contracts”.  
9 Control-share cash-out laws enable shareholders to sell their stakes to a 
“controlling” shareholder at a price based on the highest price of recently acquired 
shares. This works something like fair-price provisions (see below) extended to 
non-takeover situations.  
10 Cumulative voting – Cumulative voting allows a shareholder to 
allocate his total votes in any manner desired, where the total number of votes is 
the product of the number of shares owned and the number of directors to be 
elected. By enabling them to concentrate their votes, this practice helps enable 
minority shareholders to elect favored directors. Cumulative voting and secret 
ballot (see below), are the only two provisions whose presence is coded as an 
increase in shareholder rights, with an additional point to G if the provision is 
absent. 
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11 Directors’ duties allow directors to consider constituencies other than 
shareholders when considering a merger. These constituencies may include, for 
example, employees, host communities, or suppliers. This provision provides 
boards of directors with a legal basis for rejecting a takeover that would have been 
beneficial to shareholders. 31 states also have laws with language allowing an 
expansion of directors’ duties, but in only two of these states (Indiana and 
Pennsylvania) are the laws explicit that the claims of shareholders should not be 
held above those of other stakeholders [Pinnell (2000)]. We treat firms in these 
two states as though they had an expanded directors’ duty provision unless the 
firm has explicitly opted out of coverage under the law. 
12 Fair-Price requirements – These provisions limit the range of prices a 
bidder can pay in two-tier offers. They typically require a bidder to pay to all 
shareholders the highest price paid to any during a specified period of time before 
the commencement of a tender offer and do not apply if the deal is approved by 
the board of directors or a supermajority of the target’s shareholders. The goal of 
this provision is to prevent pressure on the target’s shareholders to tender their 
shares in the front end of a two-tiered tender offer, and they have the result of 
making such an acquisition more expensive. This category includes both the firms 
with this provision and the firms incorporated in states with a fair price law. 
13 Golden parachutes – These are severance agreements which provide 
cash and non-cash compensation to senior executives upon a triggering event such 
as termination, demotion, or resignation following a change in control. They do 
not require shareholder approval. 
14 Director indemnification – This provision uses the bylaws and/or 
charter to indemnify officers and directors from certain legal expenses and 
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judgments resulting from lawsuits pertaining to their conduct. Some firms have 
both this “indemnification” in their bylaws/charter and additional indemnification 
“contracts”. The cost of such protection can be used as a market measure of the 
quality of corporate governance [Core (2000)]. 
15 Limitations on director liability – These charter amendments limit 
directors’ personal liability to the extent allowed by state law. They often 
eliminate personal liability for breaches of the duty of care, but not for breaches of 
the duty of loyalty or for acts of intentional misconduct or knowing violation of 
the law. 
16 Pension parachute – This provision prevents an acquirer from using 
surplus cash in the pension fund of the target in order to finance an acquisition. 
Surplus funds are required to remain the property of the pension fund and to be 
used for plan participants’ benefits. 
17 Poison pills – These securities provide their holders with special rights 
in the case of a triggering event such as a hostile takeover bid. If a deal is 
approved by the board of directors, the poison pill can be revoked, but if the deal 
is not approved and the bidder proceeds, the pill is triggered. In this case, typical 
poison pills give the holders of the target’s stock other than the bidder the right to 
purchase stock in the target or the bidder’s company at a steep discount, making 
the target unattractive or diluting the acquirer’s voting power. The early adopters 
of poison pills also called them “shareholder rights” plans, ostensibly since they 
give current shareholders the “rights” to buy additional shares, but more likely as 
an attempt to influence public perceptions. A raider-shareholder might disagree 
with this nomenclature. 
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18 Secret ballot – Under secret ballot (also called confidential voting), 
either an independent third party or employees sworn to secrecy are used to count 
proxy votes, and the management usually agrees not to look at individual proxy 
cards. This can help eliminate potential conflicts of interest for fiduciaries voting 
shares on behalf of others, or can reduce pressure by management on shareholder-
employees or shareholder-partners. Cumulative voting (see above) and secret 
ballot, are the only two provisions whose presence is coded as an increase in 
shareholder rights, with an additional point to G if the provision is absent. 
19 Executive severance agreements – These agreements assure high-level 
executives of their positions or some compensation and are not contingent upon a 
change in control (unlike Golden or Silver parachutes). 
20 Silver parachutes – These are similar to golden parachutes in that they 
provide severance payments upon a change in corporate control, but unlike golden 
parachutes, a large number of a firm’s employees are eligible for these benefits. 
21 Special meeting requirements – These provisions either increase the 
level of shareholder support required to call a special meeting beyond that 
specified by state law or eliminate the ability to call one entirely. 
22 Supermajority requirements for approval of mergers – These 
charter provisions establish voting requirements for mergers or other business 
combinations that are higher than the threshold requirements of state law. They are 
typically 66.7, 75, or 85 percent, and often exceed attendance at the annual 
meeting. This category includes both the firms with this provision and the firms 
incorporated in states with a “control-share acquisition” law. These laws require a 
majority of disinterested shareholders to vote on whether a newly qualifying large 
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shareholder has voting rights. In practice, such laws work much like supermajority 
requirements. 
23 Unequal voting rights – These provisions limit the voting rights of 
some shareholders and expand those of others. Under time-phased voting, 
shareholders who have held the stock for a given period of time are given more 
votes per share than recent purchasers. Another variety is the substantial-
shareholder provision, which limits the voting power of shareholders who have 
exceeded a certain threshold of ownership. 
24 Limitations on action by written consent – These limitations can take 
the form of the establishment of majority thresholds beyond the level of state law, 
the requirement of unanimous consent, or the elimination of the right to take 
action by written consent. 
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Table 1 
Distribution of Company Bond Issuance during the Sample Period 
Table 1 shows the distribution of firms having had a bond offering from January 1991 to December 
2006. The original sample contains all the companies in the Securities Data Corporation database that 
announced a bond offering during this period. After several rounds of screening, the final sample 
contains 371 company issues and 188 companies. To be included in the final sample reported below, 
issuing firms must have data available on IRRC, CRSP and Compustat. 
Year Frequency Percent Cumulative  Frequency 
Cumulative 
percent 
1991 37 9.97 37 9.97 
1992 26 7.01 63 16.98 
1993 22 5.93 85 22.91 
1994 23 6.20 108 29.11 
1995 27 7.28 135 36.39 
1996 22 5.93 157 42.32 
1997 21 5.66 178 47.98 
1998 34 9.16 212 57.14 
1999 27 7.28 239 64.42 
2000 19 5.12 258 69.54 
2001 24 6.47 282 76.01 
2002 21 5.66 303 81.67 
2003 22 5.93 325 87.60 
2004 14 3.77 339 91.37 
2005 12 3.23 351 94.61 
2006 20 5.39 371 100.00 
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Table 2 
Sample Statistics 
Table 2 shows descriptive company and industry statistics of sample firmss. Financial variables in Panel A and SIC 
codes in Panel B were obtained from Compustat. All figures are in millions of dollars. Capital expenditure and 
sales are deflated by company total assets. All variables are measured at fiscal year-end prior to bond offering 
announcement. 
Panel A Firm Characteristics 
Mean Median Std Dev 
Total Assets $13,499.70 $5,014.15 $32,863.34
Capital Expenditure 0.066 0.054 0.05 
Sales 1.24 1.09 0.74 
Leverage 0.29 0.28 0.14 
ROA 0.06 0.06 0.05 
Panel B Industry Distribution 
2-Digit SIC Frequency % 
Cum. 
 Freq % 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 01-09 2 0.54 2 0.54 
Mining 10-14 14 3.77 16 4.31 
Construction 15-17 14 3.77 30 8.09 
Manufacturing 20-39 247 66.58 277 74.66 
Transportation, Communication 40-49 8 2.16 285 76.82 
Wholesale trade 50-51 8 2.16 293 78.98 
Retail trade 52-59 46 12.4 339 91.37 
Services 70-89 29 7.82 368 99.19 
Others 99 3 0.81 371 100.00
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Table 3 
Distribution of Corporate Governance Proxy 
Table 3 shows the frequency distribution of the two corporate governance proxies adopted in this paper – E-
index and G-index. Panel A gives the frequency distribution of E-index, which is developed by Bebchuk, 
Cohen and Ferrell (2004) and is the tally of the protective provisions employed by a company, with a range 
from 0 to 6.  The original data is published by the Investor Responsibility Research Center in Corporate 
Takeover Defences. Sample firms are assigned to an E-index portfolio according to the value of their E-index 
and the relative number of firms with each index value. Panel B shows the frequency distribution of G index, 
which is developed by Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) with a similar rationale to the E index. It is also 
defined as the number of protective provisions employed by each company only that in their approach, the 
universe of protective provisions is enlarged and contains 24 provisions in total. The original data source is 
again the IRRC in Corporate Takeover Defences. Sample firms are assigned to 4 different G-index portfolios 
according to the value of their G-index and the relative number of firms with each index value. 
Panel A – Frequency Distribution of E index 
E-index Frequency Percent 
Cumulative 
Frequency 
Cumulative 
Percent 
E-index 
 Portfolio 
0 39 10.51 39 10.51 1 
1 68 18.33 107 28.84 1 
2 91 24.53 198 53.37 2 
3 86 23.18 284 76.55 3 
4 76 20.49 360 97.04 4 
5 11 2.96 371 100.00 4 
6 0 0.00 0 0.00 4 
Panel B – Frequency Distribution of G index 
G-index Frequency Percent 
Cumulative 
Frequency 
Cumulative 
Percent 
G-index 
Portfolio 
3 2 0.54 2 0.54 1 
4 9 2.43 11 2.96 1 
5 17 4.58 28 7.55 1 
6 28 7.55 56 15.09 1 
7 22 5.93 78 21.02 1 
8 37 9.97 115 31.00 1 
9 48 12.94 163 43.94 2 
10 46 12.40 209 56.33 2 
11 47 12.67 256 69.00 3 
12 50 13.48 306 82.48 3 
13 35 9.43 341 91.91 4 
14 20 5.39 361 97.30 4 
15 6 1.62 367 98.92 4 
16 4 1.08 371 100.00 4 
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Table 4 
Distribution of bond issue by corporate governance portfolio 
Table 4 gives the distribution of company bond issuance among different corporate governance portfolio. E-
index portfolio is constructed according to the different entrenchment index of each issuing firms. Firms whose 
E-index equal to 0 or 1 are grouped into E-index portfolio 1; 2 into portfolio 2; 3 into portfolio 3 and 4 or 5 into 
portfolio 4. G-index portfolio is constructed according to the different governance index of each issuing firm. 
Firms with G-index that falls into a band of 3 to 8 are assigned to G-index portfolio 1; 9 and 10 to portfolio 2; 
11 and 12 to portfolio 3 and 13 and above to portfolio 4. 
Panel A:  Bond issuance distribution by E-index portfolio 
Per Firm Statistic 
E-index 
 Portfolio Frequency 
Cumulative  
Frequency Mean Max Min 
1 107 107 1.65 5 1 
2 91 198 1.54 4 1 
3 86 284 1.65 4 1 
4 87 371 1.77 4 1 
Panel B:  Bond issuance distribution by G-index portfolio 
Per Firm Statistic 
G-index 
 Portfolio Frequency 
Cumulative  
Frequency Mean Max Min 
1 115 115 1.69 5 1 
2 94 209 1.62 4 1 
3 97 306 1.59 4 1 
4 65 371 1.71 3 1 
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Table 5 
Average Earnings Management Surrounding Seasoned Bond Offering (E-index) 
The sample consists of 371 seasoned bond issues during January 1991 to December 2006. A seasoned bond issue is 
defined as one offered by a company that has already issued debt to the public. Relative year 0 is the year in which 
the company made the offering. E is the entrenchment index defined as the number of protective provisions adopted 
by a company. It’s a proxy for a firm’s corporate governance. Firms with high E-index is considered more manager-
friendly whereas companies with low E-index are more shareholder-friendly. Companies are grouped into different 
portfolios according to their E-index to compare the different magnitude of earnings management activity with 
different corporate governance strength. 
 To estimate the earnings management efforts of a company, I follow the approach employed in Teoh, et al (1998). 
Discretionary current accruals (DCA) are used as a measurement for the earnings management activity of a company. 
Positive and significant DCA indicates significant efforts to manage a company’s earning upwards. DCA is estimated 
by 1) running cross sectional regressions in each industry with current accruals as dependent variable and changes in 
sales as independent variable; 2) using the estimated coefficients to compute the expected change in current accruals 
for issuing firms; and 3) subtracting the expected accruals from the actual current accruals of sample firms. The 
balance is the calculated DCA of an issuing firm, i.e., its earnings management. 
Full Sample Portfolio 
E-Index=4,5,6 E-Index=3 E-Index=2 E-Index=1,0 
Year EM t-stat. EM t-stat. EM t-stat. EM t-stat. EM t-stat.
-2 0.34% 1.60 0.74% 1.71* 0.13% 0.28 0.36% 0.88 0.16% 0.40
-1 0.17% 0.78 0.88% 2.03** 0.09% 0.19 -0.01% -0.03 -0.18% -0.43
0 0.26% 1.12 0.42% 0.92 0.48% 0.97 -0.43% -0.97 0.54% 1.21
+1 0.11% 0.52 0.52% 1.18 -0.02% -0.05 -0.22% -0.48 0.18% 0.42
+2 0.23% 1.05 0.43% 1.13 0.27% 0.64 -0.03% -0.06 -0.20% -0.46
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively, using a two-tailed test. 
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Table 6 
Difference in Earnings Management  
(Compared with the most poorly governed firms measured by E-index)  
This table gives differences in the earnings management effort between the most entrenched firm portfolio and 
those less entrenched ones. E-index is used here as the proxy for corporate governance. The earnings management 
figures are obtained following the same method. A one way non-parametric test is employed to compare the means 
of different groups. In almost every case, the earnings management of the most poorly governed firm is larger than 
firms with a better governance structure. And in year -1, the earnings management difference is significantly larger 
than zero especially when compared with the best governed firms. 
E-Index=3 E-Index=2 E-Index=1,0 
Year DEM z-stat. DEM z-stat. DEM z-stat. 
-2 0.61% 1.01 0.38% 0.43 0.58% 0.91 
-1 0.79% 1.42* 0.89% 1.47* 1.06% 1.95** 
0 -0.06% -0.10 0.85% 1.27* -0.12% -0.03 
1 0.54% 1.05 0.74% 1.47* 0.34% 0.62 
2 0.16% 0.37 0.46% 0.43 0.63% 1.04 
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively, using a two-tailed test. 
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Table 7 
Cross-Sectional Regression Results for Earnings Management (E-index) 
This table shows OLS regression of corporate governance and other firm-specific variables on the 
earnings management in year -1 and year -2 prior to seasoned bond offerings. The dependent variable is 
the issuing firms’ earnings management in year -1 and year -2 prior to the bond offering respectively. 
Independent variables included: Edum, a dummy variable that equals one when the entrenchment index 
is above 4; LEV equals the firm’s total debt to total assets ration; CAPX equals the firm’s capital 
expenditure deflated by its total assets. LEV and CAPX are measured at the fiscal year end prior to the 
underlying earnings management estimates. 
Model 
EM in year -1 EM in year -2 
1 2 3 4 
Intercept -0.0001 0.0004 0.0018 0.0050 
(-0.03) (0.09) (0.83) (1.04) 
Edum 0.0078* 0.0081* 0.0090** 0.0097** 
(1.76) (1.80) (2.00) (2.14) 
LEV -0.0018 -0.0070 
(-0.14) (-0.60) 
CAPX -0.0033 -0.0159 
(-0.09) (-0.52) 
F-value 3.11* 1.09 3.99** 1.68 
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively, using 
a two-tailed test.
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Table 8 
Average Earnings Management Surrounding Seasoned Bond Offering (G-index) 
The sample consists of 371 seasoned bond issues during January 1991 to December 2006. A seasoned bond issue is 
defined as one offered by a company that has already issued debt to the public. Relative year 0 is the year in which the 
company made the offering. G is the governance index defined as the number of protective provisions adopted by a 
company. It’s a proxy for a firm’s corporate governance. Firms with high G-index is considered more manager-
friendly whereas companies with low G-index are more shareholder-friendly. Companies are grouped into different 
portfolios according to their G-index to compare the different magnitude of earnings management activity with 
different corporate governance strength. 
To estimate the earnings management efforts of a company, I follow the approach employed in Teoh, et al (1998). 
Discretionary current accruals (DCA) are used as a measurement for the earnings management activity of a company. 
Positive and significant DCA indicates significant efforts to manage a company’s earning upwards. DCA is estimated 
by 1) running cross sectional regressions in each industry with current accruals as dependent variable and changes in 
sales as independent variable; 2) using the estimated coefficients to compute the expected change in current accruals 
for issuing firms; and 3) subtracting the expected accruals from the actual current accruals of sample firms. The 
balance is the calculated DCA of an issuing firm, i.e., its earnings management. 
Full Sample Portfolio 
G-Index=13-16 G-Index=11,12 G-Index=9,10 G-Index=3-8 
Year EM t-stat. EM t-stat. EM t-stat. EM t-stat. EM t-stat.
-2 0.34% 1.60 0.87% 1.80* -0.01% -0.05 0.48% 1.25 0.13% 0.39
-1 0.17% 0.78 0.88% 1.72* 0.07% 0.18 0.43% 1.2 -0.51% -1.45
0 0.26% 1.12 0.69% 1.37 -0.04% -0.11 0.10% 0.26 0.05% 0.14
+1 0.11% 0.52 0.43% 0.96 0.42% 1.21 0.23% 0.55 -0.31% -0.87
+2 0.23% 1.05 0.37% 0.79 0.87% 2.72*** -0.14% -0.37 -0.05% -0.14
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively, using a two-tailed test. 
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Table 9 
Difference in Earnings Management  
(Compared with the most poorly governed group of issuing firms measured by G-index)
This table gives differences in the earnings management effort between the most entrenched firm portfolio and those 
less entrenched ones. G-index is used here as the proxy for corporate governance. The earnings management figures 
are obtained following the same method. A non-parametric test is employed to compare the means of different 
groups. In almost every case, the earnings management of the most poorly governed firm is larger than firms with a 
better governance structure. And in year -1, the earnings management difference is significantly larger than zero 
especially when compared with the best governed firms. 
G-Index=11,12 G-Index=9,10 G-Index=3-8 
Year DEM z-stat. DEM z-stat. DEM z-stat. 
-2 0.88% 1.85** 0.39% 0.73 0.74% 1.26* 
-1 0.81% 1.66** 0.45% 0.74 1.39% 2.36*** 
0 0.73% 1.53* 0.59% 1.12 0.64% 1.07 
1 0.01% 0.03 0.20% 0.32 0.74% 1.31* 
2 -0.50% -0.15 0.51% 0.86 0.42% 0.71 
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively, using a two-tailed test. 
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Table 10 
Cross-Sectional Regression Results for Earnings Management (G-index)
This table shows OLS regression of corporate governance and other firm-specific variables on the 
earnings management in year -1 and year -2 prior to seasoned bond offerings. The dependent 
variable is the issuing firms’ earnings management in year -1 and year -2 prior to the bond 
offering respectively. Independent variables included: Gdum, a dummy variable that equals one 
when the governance index is above 13; LEV equals the firm’s total debt to total assets ration; 
CAPX equals the firm’s capital expenditure deflated by its total assets. LEV and CAPX are 
measured at the fiscal year end prior to the underlying earnings management estimates. 
Model 
EM in year -1 EM in year -2 
1 2 3 4 
Intercept 0.0000 0.0048 0.0002 0.0022 
(0.01) (0.93) (0.09) (0.43) 
Gdum 0.0065 0.0075 0.0088* 0.0092* 
(1.19) (1.48) (1.69) (1.74) 
LEV 0.0001 -0.0083 
(0.00) (-0.67) 
CAPX 0.0147 0.0064 
(0.38) (0.20) 
F-value 1.42 0.76 2.84* 1.21 
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively, 
using a two-tailed test.
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Table 11 
Average Abnormal Returns  
Surrounding the Seasoned Bond Offering Announcements (E-index) 
Table 5 gives the results of average abnormal returns estimated based on a simple market model over the seven days 
surrounding the seasoned bond offering announcement. The market model is estimated over a 195-day period. The 
sample includes 188 companies that have had seasoned bond offering during 1991 to 2006 and 371 company issues in 
total. Sample firms are categorized into four different governance portfolios according to their entrenchment index 
developed by Bebchuk, Cohen, and Farrell (2004). E-index is a measure of a company’s corporate governance 
practice. Firms in the highest E portfolio have an E index equal to 4, 5, or 6. Managers in these companies are more 
entrenched and have more discretion over the company resource. Firms in the lowest E portfolio have an E index 
equal to 1 and 0. These companies are considered as having relatively better corporate governance practice. 
Full Sample Portfolio 
E-Index=4,5,6 E-Index=3 E-Index=2 E-Index=1,0 
Day AR t-stat AR t-stat AR t-stat AR t-stat AR t-stat 
-3 0.03% 0.5 0.01% 0.05 0.17% 1.14 0.07% 0.53 -0.08% -0.65
-2 -0.19% ***-2.96 -0.32% **-2.39 -0.28% **-2.12 0.01% 0.09 -0.18% -1.58
-1 -0.05% -0.7 -0.01% -0.05 -0.24% -1.63 -0.07% -0.49 -0.08% 0.57 
0 -0.01% -0.08 0.38% **2.52 -0.39%***-3.110.08% 0.56 -0.07% -0.54
1 0.20% ***2.68 0.26% 1.61 0.28% *1.92 0.08% 0.55 0.18% 1.33 
2 0.11% 1.39 0.25% 1.49 -0.11% -0.70 0.09% 0.62 0.18% 1.23 
3 0.10% 1.41 0.28% *1.89 0.01% 0.05 0.08% 0.61 -0.09% -0.75
Window 
(-1,1) 0.14% 1.05 0.63% **2.14 -0.35% -1.17 0.09% 0.38 0.03% 0.12 
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively, using a two-tailed test. 
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Table 12 
Cross-Sectional Regression Results for Cumulative Abnormal Returns (E-index) 
This table shows OLS regression of corporate governance and other firm-specific variables on the average 
cumulative abnormal stock return surrounding seasoned bond offerings. The dependent variable is the issuing 
firms’ three-day CAR over the window (-1, 1). Independent variables included: Edum, a dummy variable that 
equals to one when the entrenchment index is above 4; EM is the average earnings management during the 2 
years prior to the bond offering; CONTAM is a dummy variable that equals one when coincident 
comfounding news appears in the seven days surrounding the bond offering announcements; LEV equals the 
firm’s total debt to total assets ratio; CAPX equals the firm’s capital expenditure deflated by its total assets; 
ROA is the firm’s average return on asset ratio during the 3 years leading up to the bond offering year; 
SALES is the firm’s average revenue deflated by total assets during the 3 years prior the bond offering year. 
LEV and CAPX are measured as of the fiscal year-end immediately preceding the bond offering. 
Model 
1 2 3 4 5 
Intercept -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0002 0.0007 0.0024 
(-0.05) (0.05) (-0.10) (0.22) (0.47) 
Edum 0.0073** 0.0077** 0.0073** 0.0074** 0.0083**
(2.37) (2.49) (2.36) (2.40) (2.58) 
EM -0.064 -0.0612 
(-1.35) (-1.27) 
CONTAM 0.0003 0.0002 
(0.11) (0.06) 
LEV -0.0030 -0.0025 
(-0.32) (-0.26) 
CAPX -0.0097 
(-0.31) 
ROA 0.0139 
(0.46) 
SALES -0.0017 
(-0.93) 
F-value 5.62** 3.73** 2.81* 2.92* 1.20 
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively, using a two-tailed test. 
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Table 13 
Average Abnormal Returns  
surrounding the Seasoned Bond Offering Announcements (G-index) 
Table 5 gives the results of average abnormal returns estimated based on a simple market model over the seven days 
surrounding the seasoned bond offering announcement. The market model is estimated over a 195-day period. The 
sample includes 188 companies that have had seasoned bond offering during 1991 to 2006 and 371 company issues in 
total. Sample firms are categorized into four different governance portfolios according to their government index 
developed by Gompers et al (2003). G-index is a measure of a company’s corporate governance practice. Firms in the 
highest G portfolio have a G index equal to 13, 14, 15, or 16. Managers in these companies are more entrenched and 
have more discretion over the company resource. Firms in the lowest E portfolio have a G-index ranging from 3 to 8. 
These companies are considered as having relatively better corporate governance practice. 
Full Sample Portfolio 
G-Index=13-16 G-Index=11,12 G-Index=9,10 G-Index=3-8 
Day AR t-stat AR t-stat AR t-stat AR t-stat AR t-stat 
-3 0.03% 0.37 -0.27% -1.54 0.21% 1.58 -0.05% -0.37 0.12% 0.87 
-2 -0.09% -1.41 -0.32% **-2.19 -0.01% -0.12 0.05% 0.36 -0.14% -1.04
-1 -0.01% -0.16 0.03% 0.19 -0.07% -0.54 -0.16% -1.08 0.13% 1.04 
0 -0.01% -0.12 0.30% *1.90 -0.22% *-1.67 0.10% 0.79 -0.11% -0.87
1 0.12% *1.68 0.19% 1.3 0.17% 1.02 0.11% 0.76 0.05% 0.41 
2 0.05% 0.72 0.10% 0.56 0.07% 0.45 -0.01% -0.09 0.07% 0.53 
3 0.08% 1.18 0.28% 1.53 0.19% 1.29 -0.03% 1.58 -0.02% -0.14
Window 
(-1,1) 0.10% 0.73 0.52% *1.67 -0.12% -0.41 0.05% 0.18 0.07% 0.37 
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively, using a two-tailed test. 
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Table 14 
Cross-Sectional Regression Results for Cumulative Abnormal Returns (G-index)
This table shows OLS regression of corporate governance and other firm-specific variables on the average 
cumulative abnormal stock return surrounding seasoned bond offerings. The dependent variable is the issuing 
firms’ three-day CAR over the window (-1, 1). Independent variables in clued: G_DUM is a dummy variable 
that equals one when the governance index is above 13; EM is the average earnings management during the 2 
years prior to the bond offering; CONTAM is a dummy variable that equals one when coincident 
compounding news appears in the seven days surrounding the bond offering announcements; LEV equals the 
firm’s total debt to total assets ration; CAPEX equals the firm’s capital expenditure deflated by its total assets; 
ROA is the firm’s average return on asset ratio during the 3 years leading up to the bond offering year; 
SALES is the firm’s average revenue deflated by total assets during the 3 years prior the bond offering year. 
LEV and CAPEX are measured as of the fiscal year-end immediately preceding the bond offering. 
Model 
1 2 3 4 5 
Intercept 0.0004 0.0006 0.0002 0.0025 0.0020 
(0.30) (0.41) (0.10) (0.86) (0.42) 
Gdum 0.0059* 0.0062* 0.0059* 0.0057* 0.0060*
(1.84) (1.94) (1.83) (1.78) (1.81) 
EM -0.0615 -0.0580 
(-1.35) (-1.25) 
CONTAM 0.0007 0.0013 
(0.27) (0.47) 
LEV -0.0075 -0.0082 
(-0.85) (-0.86) 
CAPEX 0.0058 
(0.19) 
ROA 0.0006 
(0.02) 
SALES -0.0001 
(-0.01) 
F-value 3.39* 2.61* 1.72 2.10 0.84 
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively, using a two-tailed test. 
 
 
